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EMPLOYMENT LAW SURVEY
Prejudice, like the spider, makes everywhere its home. It has neither
taste nor choice of place, and all that it requires is room. If the one
prepares her food by poisoning it to her palate and her use, the other
does the same. Prejudice may be denominated the spider of the mind.
Thomas Paine'
INTRODUCTION
Congress designed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
2
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)3 to combat
the more overt forms of discrimination in the workplace. Case law interpreta-
tions employing similar analyses have strengthened this common bond over
time." Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA),5 however, seriously
disrupted the purpose behind Title VII and the ADEA.6 The CRA amended
Title VII to counteract four inherently anti-plaintiff Supreme Court decisions
from 1989.2 However, the CRA left the ADEA, Title VII's "statutory cous-
in,"' unchanged in regard to these decisions. Thus, much of the analysis em-
ployed under Title VII may no longer be applicable in the ADEA context.
This Survey examines how the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has decided Title VII and ADEA cases during the past year, noting
1. FORTY THOUSAND QUOTATIONS 1374 (compiled by Charles N. Douglas, 1917).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
4. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VI, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1093
(1993); see also Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1205 (1983); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979).
5. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
6. See Eglit, supra note 4, at 1101-02.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 1993). The four decisions are: Lorance v. AT&T Technol-
ogies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 900 (1989) (holding that the limitations for filing an ADEA claim run
from the date when the seniority system was adopted rather than the date plaintiffs suffered inju-
ry); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-65 (1989) (refusing to bar an action by persons who did
not intervene in a pending lawsuit that might have affected their interests); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (holding that in a Title VII case, an employer had the
burden of producing evidence of a "business justification" for the employment practice challenged
as discriminatory); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (holding that employ-
ers may not be found liable under Title VII if they can prove that they would have made the same
hiring decision if they had not taken gender into account). Of these cases, however, Wards Cove is
the only one specifically mentioned in the CRA. Congress noted that, "(2) the decision of the
Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio ... has weakened the scope and effective-
ness of Federal civil rights protections; and (3) legislation is necessary to provide additional pro-
tection against unlawful discrimination in employment." Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993)).
8. Howard Eglit noted that Title VII and the ADEA are "statutory cousins." Eglit, supra
note 4, at 1103.
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differences as well as similarities.9
First, in Hurd v. Pittsburg State University,"° the court held that Con-
gress intended the ADEA" to abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. 2 This decision, which allows claims against state agencies to be
brought in federal court, differs from previous decisions where courts declined
to rule directly on this question. 3
Second, in O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc.,4 the court determined that "seri-
ous and pervasive misconduct" is not a threshold requirement for application
of the "after-acquired evidence doctrine."' 5 This expansion of Summers v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'6 would have solidified the
indubitable nature of this defense within the Tenth Circuit. 7 However, the
United States Supreme Court limited the impact of both Summers and
O'Driscoll via its recent decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co.'
8
Finally, in Griffith v. Colorado Division of Youth Services,9 the Tenth
Circuit called into question previous decisions allowing nominal damages in
Title VII actions where monetary loss had not been proven.2" Because nomi-
nal damage awards entitle plaintiffs to "prevailing party"'" status, Griffith
would have severely limited the number of claims litigated. The discrimination
9. The Survey period includes Tenth Circuit opinions decided between Sept. 1, 1993 and
Dec. 31, 1994.
10. 29 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994).
11. Section 4(a) of the ADEA provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
12. Hurd, 29 F.3d at 565. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that, "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State," U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
13. See EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425, 1428 (10th Cir. 1985) (declin-
ing to determine whether Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it found that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an action against the state
of Wyoming); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983) (declining to decide wheth-
er Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment after finding that
the ADEA was a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause).
14. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994).
15. Id. at 179.
16. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
17. O'Driscoll, 12 F.3d at 179-80. Other circuits have held that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine does not preclude a finding of liability but only affects the available remedies. See, e.g.,
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994).
18. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
19. 17 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1994).
20. See e.g., Baker v. Weyerhauser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990) (awarding $1 in
nominal damages to a papermill employee who claimed sexual harassment based upon a hostile
work environment).
21. "Prevailing party" status allows a litigant to recover attorneys fees. This provides an
incentive to many attorneys who might not normally take valid civil rights cases due to the enor-
mous cost of litigation.
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alleged in Griffith, however, occurred prior to enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.22 Nominal damages are mostly a moot issue after the 1991 Act.
Yet, attorney's fees are potentially affected in cases currently in dispute in-
volving discrimination that occurred prior to 1991.
I. A HISTORY OF THE CHANGES IN TITLE VII AND THE ADEA
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment "against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-
gin."23 Although Title VII does not expressly refer to sexual harassment, it
has long been recognized that Title VII's protection against employment dis-
crimination includes the right to be free from gender-related harassment.24
A major advancement in sexual harassment claims occurred when the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated guidelines
which expressly defined sexual harassment as a violation of § 703 of Title
VII.25 In 1986, the Supreme Court followed suit stating, "[w]ithout question,
when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex. 26
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, offered only limited remedies to
those who had suffered discrimination." In November of 1991, President
Bush ushered in a new era of active civil rights enforcement with the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.2" The Act amended five statutes, including Title VII and
the ADEA.2 9 It expanded the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by allowing compen-
satory damages, punitive damages, and jury trials in cases of intentional dis-
crimination under Title VII.3' As a caveat, however, Congress placed limits
upon compensatory and punitive damage awards by limiting recovery accord-
ing to the size of the violating employer's company.3'
Furthermore, punitive damages are only available in cases of intentional
discrimination where the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the defendant dis-
22. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed many characteristics of Title VII. See infra text
accompanying notes 23-44.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
24. See Garber v. Saxon Business Prod., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(holding that compelling female employees to submit to the sexual advances of male supervisors
constitutes a violation of Title VII); see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
(declaring that Title VII should be interpreted liberally to prohibit a racially discriminatory envi-
ronment), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994).
26. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
27. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory and punitive damages were not
allowed in Title VII cases. See Eglit, supra note 4, at 1203-08.
28. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
29. The Act also amended three other statutes: The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
of 1990, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, and The Civil Rights Attorney's Awards Act of 1976.
30. Note, however, that punitive damages may not be awarded against governmental entities.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3). A plaintiff may recover a maximum of $300,000 from employ-
ers who have more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks and a maximum of
$50,000 from employers with between 14 and 101 employees.
1995]
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criminated "with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual. ' 32 The legislative history and structure of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicate that punitive damages are recoverable
only in particularly egregious instances of intentional discrimination."
Title VII did not provide for jury trials prior to the 1991 Act. After the
1991 Act, however, either party may insist upon a jury trial where the plaintiff
requests compensatory or punitive damages. 34 The 1991 Act also specifies
that juries should not be informed of the damage caps" to ensure that juries.
do not return lower verdicts than they might otherwise have rendered. 6
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also amended some provisions of the
ADEA. Specifically, it amended section 7(e) of the ADEA by eliminating the
two/three year statute of limitations and mandating the 180-360 day filing
requirements in Title VII. 37 Further, it requires the EEOC to provide notice to
the parties upon termination of its investigation, and to provide claimants
ninety days after receipt of such notice in which to file a civil action.38
For the most part, Title VII and ADEA decisions have been consistent.39
The 1991 Act, however, brought several changes. Unlike Title VII, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 does not amend the ADEA to allow punitive and compen-
satory damages in intentional discrimination cases.' Congress's failure to
provide such damages under the ADEA implies its acquiescence in the ADEA
arena to Supreme Court decisions found intolerable in the Title VII context.4
Apparently, age discrimination is not as important as race or sex discrimina-
tion.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is also silent as to whether the "substantial
factor" requirement set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins42 applies to the
32. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(l).
33. 137 CONG. REc. S15,483-84 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth that
punitive damages may only be awarded in egregious cases).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. V 1993).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2).
36. 'The bill specifically provides that the jury shall not be informed of the existence or
amount of the caps on damage awards. Thus, no pressure, upward or downward, will be exerted
on the amount of jury awards by the existence of the statutory limitations." 137 CONG. REC.
S15,484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)-(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e).
39. The text of the ADEA is largely identical to that of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The only major difference is that the term "age" has been substituted in the ADEA for the
Title VII phrase "race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972). Because the prohibitions in both acts are similar, the
Supreme Court has found interpretations under Title VII equally applicable to the ADEA. See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1978). Note that Title VII decisions
are not applicable to the ADEA where the issue is one of specific statutory construction and the
statutory language differs. Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC En-
forcement, 23 STETsON L. REV. 53, 88 (1993).
40. See, e.g., Lee v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
41. See Eglit, supra note 4, at 1206 n.365 (citing Catherine Ventrell-Monsees, Ageism: The
Segregation of a Civil Right, EXCHANGE ON AGEING, LAW & ETmcs, BULLETIN No. 8, Spring
1992, at 1 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Gerontological Society of America, Nov.
24, 1991)).
42. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In a claim of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that gender
was a substantial or "motivating" factor in the employer's decision. Id. at 244.
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ADEA. There is also no clear answer as to whether the Civil Rights Act of
1991 overturned Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,43 which held that the
statute of limitations runs from the date of the discriminatory act as opposed
to the date of the injury." Against this backdrop, this Survey now examines
how the Tenth Circuit has decided cases involving both Title VII and the
ADEA.
II. A REJECTION OF FEDERALISM AND THE "PLAIN STATEMENT" RULE?:
HURD V. PITTSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY4
A. Background
The cornerstone of federalism is the unbending concept that both the
Union, and the States which comprise it, have certain powers in which the
other should not interfere.' The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
was intentionally designed to limit the powers of the federal government.47
All powers not specifically granted to the federal government are retained by
the states.'
The Eleventh Amendment's immunity provision49 further solidifies this
fortress of federalism by forbidding private parties from bringing suit against
states in federal court absent congressional intent to abrogate the amendment.
Therefore, the main question is, when does legislation enacted by Congress
evince a desire to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment? Results differ depending
on whether the statute was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause or sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Courts are very hesitant to infer congressional intent to override Eleventh
Amendment immunity when statutes are enacted merely in accordance with
43. 490 U.S. 900 (1989)
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) overrides Lorance in that
[f]or purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a
seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose...
when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniori-
ty system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority
system or a provision of the system.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
45. 29 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994).
46. As James Madison noted in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10:
[I]t clearly appears, that the same advantage which a Republic has over a Democracy, in
controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small Republic, - is
enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it .... The influence of factitious lead-
ers may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a
general conflagration through the other States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982).
47. The Tenth Amendment states that "[tlhe powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
48. For the unconventional view that the Tenth Amendment refers to state powers created by
the Constitution rather than residual powers, see 3 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY,
JR., POLITICS AND THE CONSTrrTUrION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 36-37 (1980).
49. Supra note 12.
1995]
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the Commerce Clause.50 In National League of Cities v. Usery,51 the Su-
preme Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which required state and
local governments to comply with minimum wage and overtime pay require-
ments, was unconstitutional.52 The Court acknowledged the plenary powers of
Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause.53 According to the
Court, however, the states also have plenary powers in matters of state sover-
eignty that are implicit in the Tenth Amendment's guarantee of federalism.54
State sovereignty, in and of itself, therefore imposes external limits on
Congress's ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause with regard to
issues affecting a state's separate and independent existence.55 Importantly,
National League's holding was limited to statutes enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.56
Conversely, when Congress legislates under the enforcement clause of the
Civil War Amendments (section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment),57 the Su-
preme Court has rejected the assertion that state functions which relate to
sovereignty are inviolate.58 Section 5 states that, "[tihe Congress shall have
the power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this arti-
cle."59 According to the Court, "principles of federalism that might otherwise
be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the
power to enforce the Civil War Amendments [prohibiting racial inequality] 'by
appropriate legislation."' "Those amendments were specifically designed as
an expansion of federal power and a limit of state sovereignty. '
50. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976). The Court is not hesitant,
however, when Congress legislates pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and expresses its intent
to override state immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984). Note that Congress does not need to explicitly state its legislative intent. The Court liber-
ally construes congressional intent when it considers legislation passed pursuant to § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-78 (1980).
51. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
52. Id. at 856. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), as originally promulgated,
excluded the states and their political subdivisions from its definition of "employer." See ch. 676,
§ 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938). This was changed via later amendments. See Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a), 88 Stat. 58 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d) (1988)).
53. National League, 426 U.S. at 840.
54. Id. at 842. The federal government's power is "supreme within its sphere of action," but
it is, nevertheless, a government of limited powers. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 405-06 (1819).
55. National League, 426 U.S. at 845. The Court noted that applying the FLSA requirements
to the states would indeed interfere with state autonomy. Id. at 851-52. For example, the court
noted that FLSA requirements would impose substantial costs on state employers. Id. at 846.
Increased costs would force states to either raise taxes or cancel programs. Id. at 848.
56. Id. at 852 n.17.
57. The Civil War Amendments refer to Amendments 13-15 of the United States Constitu-
tion. These amendments primarily abolish slavery and guarantee equal protection of the law to all
races in the United States.
58. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (holding that Con-
gress acted permissibly- under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted § 1 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, which prohibited states from making electoral changes that had a discrimina-
tory effect).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.




Although Congress originally passed Title VII pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which extend the definition of
employers to include states, were enacted pursuant to section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 62 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,63 the Supreme Court held that
a state government employer could be held liable for money damages despite
the Eleventh Amendment, if it violated the prohibitions against discrimination
under Title VII.' In this way, the Court extended Fourteenth Amendment
rights to state government employees who are the victims of Title VII discrim-
ination. The Court declared that Congress could take steps to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even if such action
would ordinarily violate the Eleventh Amendment.65
Although federal legislation affecting race and gender discrimination has
found refuge in section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the ADEA has not
found a similar safe haven. Some courts contend that the ADEA was enacted
pursuant to section 5,' while others insist that it was enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.67 The Supreme Court added to the confusion by refusing
to answer the question definitively. In EEOC v. Wyoming,68 the EEOC argued
that Wyoming's mandatory retirement policy, which required game wardens to
retire at age fifty-five, violated the ADEA.6 The Court upheld the ADEA as
a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power regardless of the Tenth
Amendment, but declined to decide whether the ADEA was also enacted pur-
suant to section 5.70 However, the Court reaffirmed that Congress is not lim-
ited by Tenth Amendment constraints when legislating under section 5, but is
so constrained when legislating under the Commerce Clause.7
Prior to its decision in Hurd v. Pittsburg State University,72 the Tenth
Circuit had not clearly addressed this important issue. In EEOC v. Wyoming
Retirement System,73 the court did not decide whether the ADEA was enacted
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
EEOC-instead of a private individual-was suing the state, rendering Elev-
enth Amendment immunity inapplicable.74 Hurd forced the Tenth Circuit to
take a stance on this issue.
62. Fitzpatrick v. Britzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9 (1976).
63. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
64. Id. at 456-57.
65. Id. at 456. One of the most unusual aspects of this case was the absence of dissenting
opinions. In fact, Justice Rehnquist, who later dissented in City of Rome, wrote the opinion.
66. See, e.g., EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the ADEA
is a valid extension of Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
67. See, e.g., McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-07 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (concluding
that the ADEA is a valid extension of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
68. 460 U.S. 226 (1993).
69. Id. at 234.
70. Id. at 243.
71. Id. at 243 n. 18. Since the Supreme Court's decision, at least two other jurisdictions have
held the ADEA to be enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Heiar v.
Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715
F.2d 694, 700 (1st Cir. 1983).
72. 29 F.3d 564 (loth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321 (1994).
73. 771 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 1428.
19951
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B. Facts
The plaintiff, a state employee, brought a claim against Pittsburg State
University (PSU) alleging discriminatory discharge in violation of the ADEA.
In the district court, PSU sought to dismiss the plaintiff's claim by arguing
that the Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to the state against a private
action in federal court.7' Both parties agreed that PSU was an agency of the
state of Kansas,76 and that the state law claim for breach of an implied em-
ployment contract was barred from federal jurisdiction by the Eleventh
Amendment.
71
Noting that Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated where: (1)
Congress evinces an "'unequivocal expression of congressional intent' to do
so;" and (2) Congress "authorizes such suits pursuant to section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment,""8 the district court held that the ADEA indeed was
enacted pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.79 The district
court then relied heavily on the holdings of other jurisdictions to support its
contention that the legislative history of the ADEA evinced "'a congressional
purpose to prevent arbitrary age discrimination within the protected age group
by extending the coverage of the Act to state and local governments.', 0
The district court rejected the defense's assertion that Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity was required by the Supreme Court's holding in Employees v.
Missouri Department of Public Health and Welfare."' There, the Court con-
cluded that Congress did not mean to abrogate state immunity under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a statute with language virtually identical to the
ADEA."2 The district court distinguished Employees by noting that the FLSA
was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, while the ADEA was enacted
75. Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 821 F. Supp. 1410, 1411 (D. Kan. 1993).
76. Id.
77. Id. The day prior to the Hurd decision, the Tenth Circuit specifically noted that "pendent
jurisdiction ... may [not] override the Eleventh Amendment." Mascheroni v. Board of Regents,
28 F.3d 1554, 1559 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121). If Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity is not raised as a defense, a federal court may or may not examine the issue.
Some jurisdictions adhere to a "mandatory" rule which requires a court to consider Eleventh
Amendment immunity sua sponte as a jurisdictional matter, whereas other jurisdictions adhere to a
"permissive" rule which merely authorizes a court to raise the issue when not raised by the de-
fendant. See Mascheroni, 28 F.3d at 1558-59.
78. Hurd, 821 F. Supp. at 1412 (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99).
79. Id. at 1412. According to the court, the 1974 amendments to the ADEA extended its
protection to federal, state, and local government employees. Id. The legislative history indicated
"a congressional purpose to prevent arbitrary age discrimination." Id. (quoting EEOC v. Elrod,
674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982)). The discrimination prohibited by the ADEA goes to the very es-
sence of the 14th Amendment. Id. Even though the ADEA does not expressly state that it was
enacted pursuant to § 5, the Supreme Court has previously held that "Congress does not have to
recite the words 'Section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'Equal Protection' in order for a stat-
ute to be based on it." Id. (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 (1983)).
80. Id. (quoting Elrod, 674 F.2d at 605); see also Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d
441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that Congress made its intention to abrogate l1th Amendment
immunity crystal clear by including states in the ADEA definition of "employers" who may be
liable for legal and equitable relief).
81. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
82. Hurd, 821 F. Supp. at 1413. The FLSA, like the ADEA, authorizes suits "in any Federal
or State court of competent jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
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pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."3
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
In a one paragraph opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision in Hurd.4 Finding that the district
court's opinion was "thorough and well-reasoned," Judge McCay merely noted
two additional decisions supporting the district court's holding that Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not bar actions against a state under the ADEA.s5
D. Analysis
According to the Supreme Court, when a federal statute alters the balance
of power between the states and the federal government, Congress must clear-
ly state its intent to extend the statute to the states. 6 This holding is known
as the "plain statement rule."" The plain statement rule was adopted by the
courts, mainly out of concern over Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.8 In Gregory v. Ashcroft,89 however, a majority of the Supreme
Court altered the rule's analysis by refusing to extend the ADEA to state
appointed judges.9' According to the Court, the exception to the ADEA for
"appointee[s] at the policymaking level" could include judges, and since Con-
gress did not specifically exempt them from this exception, judges were obvi-
ously meant to be included in the exception.9 The reasoning is flawed, how-
ever, because the language of the exception seems an odd way of including
"judges" within its parameters. The most accurate interpretation of the plain
statement rule is that since judges are not specifically mentioneL' in the excep-
tion, they are covered by the ADEA. In this opinion, the Court essentially
expands an extreme state's rights notion at the expense of many victims of
discrimination.
83. Hurd, 821 F. Supp. at 1413.
84. Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 29 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 321
(1994).
85. Id. at 564 (citing Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985), and Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 700 (lst Cir.
1983)).
86. Atascadero v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985); see generally, Deanna L. Ruddock,
Note, Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and Judicial Supervision of Federal-State
Relations, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1563 (1992).
87. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
88. Id.
89. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
90. Id. at 467.
91. Id.; see also Ruddock, supra note 86, at 1566. Note that the dissent believed that the
alteration of Garcia's plain statement rule would simply result in confusion. Gregory, 501 U.S. at
477 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White:
[Tihe majority's approach is also unsound because it will serve only to confuse the
law.... The majority does not explain its requirement that Congress's intent to regulate
a particular state activity be "plain to anyone reading [the federal statute]." Does that
mean that it is now improper to look to the purpose or history of a federal statute in
determining the scope of the statute's limitations on state activities?
Id. at 478.
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Some scholars have argued that since federalism barriers are beginning to
creep into the Commerce Clause analysis, Congress's power under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment should be expanded as much as possible.92 The
Tenth Circuit's analysis in Hurd apparently adopted this view by side-stepping
the plain statement analysis outlined by the Rehnquist Court in Gregory. It
should follow that if Congress had the power to prohibit gender discrimination
under section 5, that power should extend to prohibit age discrimination. In
fact, the Tenth Circuit has only brought the ADEA on par with Title VII-its
statutory cousin-in this respect. This is a step in the right direction, however,
and other circuits should adopt the same view.
III. EMPLOYEE MISREPRESENTATION AND THE "ABSOLUTION" '9 3 DEFENSE
UNDER TITLE VII: O'DRSCOLL V. HERCULES, INC.94
A. Background
While employers should be allowed to introduce evidence that an employ-
ee was dismissed because of misconduct in defense to Title VII claims of
discrimination, the waters are murkier when the employer seeks to introduce
evidence of misconduct unknown at the time of the alleged discrimination.95
Both the courts and Congress have addressed this issue in some form.96
The origins of the after-acquired evidence doctrine are found in Mount
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.97 In Mt. Healthy, a
teacher claimed that the school board had taken adverse actions against him
for exercising his First Amendment rights.9" The school board acknowledged
that the plaintiff's speech was one of the reasons for the plaintiff's dis-
charge." The school board also contended, however, that the plaintiff was
dismissed for using obscene gestures toward students." The Supreme Court
92. E.g., Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights,
Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 1029, 1083 (1993).
93. The strict form of the after-acquired evidence doctrine has been described by some
commentators as a form of "absolution." Rebecca H. White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper
Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 35 B.C. L. REv. 49, 52
(1993).
94. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
95. James G. Babb, Comment, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence as a Defense in Title VII
Employment Discrimination Cases, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1945, 1946 (1994).
96. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the plurality opinion, authored by
Justice Brennan, rejected the use of after-acquired evidence in mixed-motive cases. Id. at 252. Yet,
many courts have ignored the holding of Price Waterhouse. One court has even used Price Water-
house to support the use of after-acquired evidence in mixed-motive cases. See Deshaw v. Lord &
Taylor, No. 90 Civ. 0490 (JFK), 1991 WL 107271, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 13, 1991) (citing Price
Waterhouse to permit the use of after-acquired evidence in an ADEA suit). Congress responded to
the uncertainties by amending Title VII to read, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchap-
ter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993).
97. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
98. Id. at 276.




held that the school board could escape a finding that discrimination was a
"substantial factor" in their refusal to rehire the plaintiff by establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the decision to discharge the plaintiff
would have been reached based solely on the use of obscene gestures.' °'
This defense has come to be known as the "would have terminated anyway"
standard.'o2
The seminal case regarding after-acquired evidence in the Tenth Circuit is
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 3 The plaintiff in
Summers was satisfactorily employed as a field claim representative for seven-
teen years, when State Farm discovered that he had forged a signature on one
of the claims."° State Farm immediately warned the plaintiff that subsequent
falsifications would result in termination. 5 Years later, State Farm dis-
missed the plaintiff, who subsequently filed suit alleging a violation of the
ADEA." During discovery, nearly four years after the plaintiff had been
terminated, State Farm discovered evidence that the plaintiff had falsified over
150 additional claims. 7
Relying on Mt. Healthy, State Farm argued that the evidence was relevant
and should absolutely bar the plaintiff's claim.' 8  The Tenth Circuit
agreed." According to the court:
[t]o argue ... that this after-acquired evidence should be ignored is
utterly unrealistic. The present case is akin to the hypothetical where-
in a company doctor is fired because of his age ... and the company,
in defending a civil rights action, . . . discovers that the ... employee
was not a "doctor." In our view .... Summers is in no better posi-
tion.'"'
Many courts have followed Summers by adopting some form of the doc-
trine."I
There are some serious doubts, however, about the proper legal applica-
tion of Mt. Healthy in Summers. Mt. Healthy was a mixed-motive case in
which a valid reason did exist for firing the plaintiff at the time of dis-
101. Id. at 287.
102. See Babb, supra note 95, at 1951.
103. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
104. Id. at 702.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 701-02.
107. Id. at 703.
108. Id. at 705.
109. Id. at 708.
110. Id.
111. See Dotson v. United States Postal Serv., 977 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 263 (1992) (following the Summers doctrine that after-acquired evidence may be used
where a plaintiff omitted current use of prescription drugs on an employment application);
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting commitment
to the Summers doctrine in denying relief to the plaintiff in a sex discrimination case where she
omitted to mention a prior conviction for drunk driving on her employment application), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993). Cf. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir.
1994) (rejecting the Summers rule by limiting the use of after-acquired evidence), vacated, 115 S.
Ct. 1397 (1995).
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charge." 2 In Summers, the employer acted solely with the intent to discrimi-
nate.' 1
3
In Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.," 4 the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the Summers rule that after-acquired evidence was an absolute bar to any
claim of discrimination." 5 According to the court, "[tihe Summers rule is an-
tithetical to the principal purpose of Title VII-'to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunity' by giving employees incentives 'to self-examine ... em-
ployment practices and to endeavor to eliminate' ... employment discrimina-
tion."' 16
Wallace, a case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, involved
claims of hostile work environment and sexual harassment, as well as retalia-
tory discharge under the Equal Pay Act (EPA).' During a deposition, the
defendant discovered that the plaintiff had lied about a previous narcotics
conviction on her employment application."8 It was undisputed that the em-
ployer would not have hired the plaintiff had it been aware of the narcotics
conviction."'9
The court agreed that Mt. Healthy provided "persuasive guidance concern-
ing after-acquired evidence," but chided the Tenth Circuit for misapplying the
doctrine. 2 ' According to the Eleventh Circuit, Summers represented "an un-
warranted extension of Mt. Healthy" since it effectively
ignore[d] the lapse of time between the employment decision and the
discovery of a legitimate motive. Whereas the Mt. Healthy rule ex-
cuses all liability based on what actually would have happened absent
the unlawful motive, the Summers rule goes one step further: it ex-
cuses all liability based on what hypothetically would have occurred
absent the alleged discriminatory motive assuming the employer had
knowledge that it would not acquire until sometime during the litiga-
tion arising from the discharge.'
Mt. Healthy refused to allow membership in a protected class to place plain-
tiffs in a worse position, yet Summers achieved precisely this result.'22
The Summers rule does not encourage employers to eliminate dis-
crimination. Rather, it invites employers to establish ludicrously low
thresholds for "legitimate" termination and to devote fewer resources
to preventing discrimination because Summers gives them the option
to escape all liability by rummaging through an unlawfully-discharged
112. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
113. Summers, 864 F.2d at 702.
114. 968 F.2d 1174 (1 lth Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 1178.
116. Id. at 1180 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
117. Id. at 1176.
118. Id. at 1176-77.
119. Id. at 1185 (Godbold, J., dissenting).





employee's background for flaws.'23
While the Eleventh Circuit refused to allow after-acquired evidence to bar
claims of discrimination, it did allow this evidence to go to the issue of avail-
able remedies, including attorney fees. 24 The court "agree[d] with the ab-
stract proposition ... that after-acquired evidence is relevant to the relief due"
to the plaintiff.2 Wallace is best viewed as a direct limit on the doctrine as
announced in Summers.
During the Survey term, the Tenth Circuit was given an opportunity to




Dorthea O'Driscoll, a Quality Control Inspector, was terminated by Her-
cules, Inc. after six years of employment. 27 She brought suit alleging that
her termination violated the ADEA.'12
While preparing for trial, the defendant discovered that O'Driscoll had
misrepresented information on her employment application, 29 her health in-
surance application, and her security clearance application. 3 Hercules main-
tained that it would have fired the plaintiff had it known about the false state-
ments. 3' In her defense, plaintiff presented evidence that misrepresentations
by other employees had not resulted in their termination.
3 2
The district court, however, relying on Summers, found that the plaintiff
had no right to relief in the face of unrefuted evidence that the defendant
would have dismissed the plaintiff had it known of her misconduct.'33 Ac-
cordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.'34
123. Id. at 1180.
124. Id. at 1181, 1183.
125. Id. at 1181.
126. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
127. Id. at 177.
128. Id. The plaintiff also asserted state law claims of wrongful termination and breach of
employment contract. Id.
129. The specific evidence was that she misrepresented her age, her childrens' ages, her date
of high school graduation and the amount of education she had received. Id. at 177-78.
130. Id. at 178.
131. Id. In support of its contention, Hercules offered the following language from the em-
ployment application: "I understand that any misrepresentation made by me herein may result in
the cancellation of this employment application ... without any obligation or liability to me other
than payment of the rate agreed upon for services actually rendered." Id. Hercules also presented
affidavits by company management stating that the managers would have fired the plaintiff had
they known about her misrepresentations. Id.
132. Id. The plaintiff's evidence regarding other employees included falsification of time
cards and false statements concerning employee's whereabouts while on duty. The plaintiff also
noted that Hercules' Management Manual Procedure handbook specified that violations which
occurred more than twelve months prior were not to be taken into account by the supervisor in
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C. Tenth Circuit Decision
Initially, the Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs assertion that Summers
only applies in the face of serious and pervasive employee misconduct.
35
Rather, the court clarified Summers by announcing a more lenient three-prong
burden of proof that defendants must satisfy to benefit from the doctrine's
application: the employer must prove that (1) it was unaware of the miscon-
duct when the employee was discharged; (2) the misconduct would have justi-
fied the discharge; and (3) it would indeed have discharged the employee, had
the employer known of the misconduct.'36
While deeming serious misconduct as not dispositive, the court did note
that the plaintiff's actions represented a pattern of dishonest behavior.'37 Fur-
thermore, O'Driscoll's evidence of other employees who were not fired for
dishonesty was irrelevant. According to the court, the plaintiff had not provid-
ed any evidence that Hercules had retained other employees who had commit-
ted similar infractions equivalent to her numerous misrepresentations. 3 '
D. Analysis
By giving examples of irrelevant evidence, while failing to define what is
relevant, Summers and O'Driscoll encourage employers to "comb 'an
employee's file ... [for] minor, trivial, or technical infractions.""' 39 If, under
O'Driscoll, serious or pervasive conduct is unnecessary, what then is required?
The Summers standard requires the employer to show that it would have fired
the plaintiff for the act at issue. Yet, the idea that an employer would actually
admit that it would not have fired the employee had it known of the miscon-
duct is dubious. Responding to such obvious pitfalls of the doctrine's applica-
tion, the Supreme Court recently rejected the Tenth Circuit's harsh interpreta-
tion of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co. "
Ms. McKennon, age 62, claimed that Nashville Banner violated the
ADEA by discharging her because of her age. 4' She further asserted that the
district court misapplied the after-acquired evidence doctrine by admitting
evidence, discovered during a deposition, that she had photocopied sensitive
materials-in contravention of handbook policy-for her "protection."' 42 Ar-
guing that the after-acquired evidence doctrine should not apply to her case,
McKennon attempted to distinguish her case from the employment application
135. Id. at 179. According to the court, "there is no threshold requirement of serious and
pervasive misconduct" under the Summers doctrine. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 179-80.
138. Id. at 180.
139. See Babb, supra note 95, at 1958-59 (quoting O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp.
656, 659 (D. Utah 1990)).
140. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
141. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 540 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
142. Id. at 540-41. Ms. McKennon allegedly copied the materials in anticipation of being
terminated because of her age. Id.
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fraud precedents by pointing to the clear nexus between her alleged miscon-
duct and the discrimination claim.43 Noting that the Sixth Circuit had al-
ready adopted Summers,'" the court of appeals rejected the nexus argument
and affirmed the lower court's decision. 45
The Supreme Court granted certiorari'" to resolve the conflicting circuit
opinions regarding the complete denial of relief in after-acquired evidence
situations. 47 According to the Court, ADEA violations are not so trivial as to
preclude enforcement on a showing of misconduct." The Court held that
allowing after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing to bar all relief undermines
the purpose of the ADEA--"elimination of discrimination in the
workplace."' 49
Importantly, the Supreme Court limited the application of Mt. Healthy to
mixed-motive firings, 5 ° thereby rejecting the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in
Summers. The Court, however, also emphasized the importance of the
employee's wrongdoing by eliminating the remedies of front pay and reinstate-
ment in this and similar cases.'5' The appropriate remedy in such cases, is an
award of backpay calculated from the date of the unlawful discharge to the
date of the acquisition of the evidence.'52 After considering any extraordinary
circumstances relating to either party, the resulting figure is the employee's
remedy. 5 ' Perhaps realizing the vagueness of the "would have terminated
anyway" standard, the Court explained that the employer must establish that
the misconduct was so severe that the employee in fact would have been fired
on that ground alone had the employer known of it at the time of dis-
charge.'54 Although the court failed to define "in fact," this mandate is stron-
ger than the Tenth Circuit's third prong in O'Driscoll. Although the Court
declined to expressly overrule O'Driscoll,'55 McKennon requires employers
143. Id. at 541.
144. Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
145. McKennon, 9 F.3d at 542, 543 n.8. The court stated that "if Mrs. McKennon's nexus
theory were adopted, it would apply where an employee takes money from her employer for sup-
port of herself in anticipation of an unlawful discharge." Id.
146. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
147. In addition to the Tenth Circuit's Summers doctrine and the Eleventh Circuit's Wallace
decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Smith v. General Scanning Inc., 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989),
provided yet another analysis. Combining Summers and Wallace, Smith allowed after-acquired
evidence to prohibit back pay after the discovery of the misconduct. Id. at 1320 n.2. The EEOC
has expressly adopted this position. Revised General Counsel's Memorandum on Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 718, at 405:7105, 7108 (March, 1993). The Supreme Court,
in McKennon, ultimately adopted a similar compromise between the employer's concern about
misconduct and the employee's rights against discrimination. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886; see
also infra text accompanying notes 148-53.
148. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883-84.
149. Id. at 884 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979)).
150. Id. at 885. A mixed-motive firing occurs when an employer fires an employee for both
lawful and unlawful reasons. Mt. Healthy involved a mixed-motive firing; Summers did not. Id.;
see also supra text accompanying notes 103-13.
151. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 886-87.
155. Id. at 885. Subsequently, the Court vacated O'Driscoll for reconsideration in light of
McKennon. O'Driscoll, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
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to present more evidence than a mere statement that they would have fired the
plaintiff. Thus, employers should protect themselves by explicitly outlining
reasons for discharge either in a procedural handbook or through longstanding
company policies.
IV. THE DEATH KNELL FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES: GRIFFITH V. COLORADO
DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES 6
A. Background
At common law, courts vindicated the deprivation of "inalienable" rights,
which did cause actual injury, by awarding nominal sums of money."7
Awarding nominal damages without proof of actual injury signified the impor-
tance accorded certain rights in society.'58 Prior to the 1991 amendments to
the Civil Rights Act, six jurisdictions addressed the question of nominal dam-
ages in Title VII actions. Five, including the Tenth Circuit, awarded nominal
damages under Title VII. 5 9 For example, in Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., the
Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court's award to the plaintiff of one dollar in
her "hostile work environment" sexual harassment claim, in addition to
$90,000 in actual and punitive damages on a state claim of outrageous con-
duct."s°
An award of nominal damages is critical in many cases because courts
have held such damages to be a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees
under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that a court may, in its dis-
cretion, allow a prevailing plaintiff to recover attorney's fees in Title VII ac-
tions. '6 In order to be deemed prevailing, however, the party must have at
156. 17 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1994).
157. Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Rem-
edy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 403, 441
(1993) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (alteration in original)).
158. Id..
159. See Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming a $1 nominal
damage award in a "hostile work environment" sexual harassment case); Huddleston v. Roger
Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 905 (11th Cir. 1988); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340,
344 (10th Cir. 1986) (affirming a nominal damage award in a sex discrimination case); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253 n.l (4th Cir. 1983); Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir. 1982);
Joshi v. Florida State Univ., 646 F.2d 981, 991 n.33 (5th Cir. Unit B June), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
972 (1981).
160. The court of appeals affirmed based upon the following findings:
(1) sexual harassment of an employee which creates a hostile or offensive work environ-
ment is actionable under Title VII; (2) for such conduct to be actionable it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of employment [as Baker had
demonstrated through the remarks and actions of her co-workers]; (3) damages for emo-
tional distress, however, are not actionable under Title VII; and [since this was the only
damage Baker suffered] (4) accordingly, the issues are found in favor of Baker and her
nominal damages are assessed at $1.00.
Baker, 903 F.2d at 1343. Note that this case came to trial before the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Thus, there were few Title VII remedies available to plaintiffs in "hostile work environment"
cases.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that:
In any action or proceeding under [Title VII] the court, in its discretion, may allow the
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least been awarded nominal damages.62
The only circuit which has consistently denounced awarding nominal
damages in Title VII cases is the Seventh Circuit.163 In Bohen v. City of East
Chicago,' Judge Easterbrook, acknowledging that a number of courts have
found nominal damages to be viable under Title VII, held that "[nominal]
damages are not 'equitable relief' within the meaning of Title VII. 6 1 Be-
cause Title VII's language mandates equitable relief but not damages, the
court rejected the plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees." Similarly, in
Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.,67 the Seventh Circuit over-
turned a lower court's decision to provide nominal damages in a sexual ha-
rassment claim where a plaintiff could not prove economic harm. 6 The
court found that where reinstatement, backpay, and any other sources of com-
pensatory damages are not available, the defendant must prevail on the mer-
its.1
69
The Supreme Court has not addressed the role of nominal damages in
defining a "prevailing party" under Title VII. The Court, however, has re-
solved a similar issue in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Farrar v. Hob-
by, '7 the Court declined to allow an attorney's fees award where the plain-
tiff was awarded only nominal damages. 7' According to the Court, the
threshold requirement for being considered a prevailing party is met "when
actual relief on the merits of [plaintiff's] claim materially alters the legal rela-
tionship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way
that directly benefits the plaintiff." "' While the moral satisfaction of win-
ning a lawsuit does not bestow "prevailing party" status,'73 a judgment for
damages--compensatory, punitive, or nominal-changes the legal relationship
prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee ... as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
162. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (7th Cir. 1990); Dockter v.
Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1990); Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).




167. 882 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
168. Id. at 1239-40. Here, the economic harm required was a showing that the harassment
resulted in discharge. Id.
169. Id. at 1240.
170. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
171. Id. at 570.
172. Id. This definition is a culmination of three previous decisions. See Texas State Teachers
Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (noting that to be considered a pre-
vailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be able to point to a change in the
legal relationship between itself and the defendant); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per
curiam) (reaffirming that a judgment will constitute relief for purposes of § 1988 only if it affects
the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61 (1987)
(observing that respect for the ordinary language of § 1988 requires that a plaintiff obtain some
relief on the merits before he can be said to prevail).
173. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 573-74.
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between the parties, as the defendant is thereby required to pay money not
previously due.'74
Despite the plaintiff's prevailing party status in Farrar, the Court denied
attorney's fees by subjecting the nominal damage award to a reasonableness
test.'75 The Court recognized two classes of prevailing parties-those with
actual, compensable injuries, and those without such injuries.'76 Those plain-
tiffs unable to demonstrate actual injuries receive only nominal damages.'77
Both classes of plaintiffs are "prevailing" only for the purpose of guaranteeing
enforcement against the defendant. 7 ' The prevailing party status, however,
will not allow a "nominal damages prevailing party" to circumvent case law
requiring a reasonably proportionate relationship between a nominal damage
award and an attorney's fee award.'79 The Court emphasized that one of the
most essential factors in determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee
award is the degree of success obtained." Indeed, the Court determined that
when an essential element of the plaintiff's claim for monetary relief is not
proven-as is the case for plaintiffs granted nominal damages solely to ensure
enforcement against the defendant--"the only reasonable fee is usually no fee
at all."'' Thus, the presence or absence of neither the prevailing party status
nor nominal damages were determinative to attorney's fees. The weakness of
plaintiff's showing-the absence of actual injury, and the unsuccessful mone-
tary claim-caused the Court's rejection of the claim for attorney's fees."2
B. Facts
In Griffith v. Colorado Division of Youth Services, a female employee
accused her male supervisor at the Division of Youth Services ("DYS") in
Adams County, Colorado, of racial discrimination and sexual harassment.8 3
The defendant supervisor referred to the plaintiff as a "stupid white woman"
and forcefully reprimanded her in the presence of others at the division. 4
Following an investigation, the defendant supervisor was discharged.8 5
174. Id. at 574.





180. Id.; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983).
181. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 575.
182. The dissent noted that the case should have been remanded for a consideration of the
reasonableness of the award as the majority did not find that nominal damages could never sup-
port the awarding of attorney's fees. Id. at 579 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The dissent agreed that awarding $280,000 in attorney's fees where the plaintiff had only recov-
ered one dollar in a $17,000,000 suit was excessive as a matter of law. However, the dissent re-
fused to agree that the appropriate award was no fee at all. Id.
183. 17 F.3d 1323, 1324 (10th Cir. 1994). Griffith further alleged that she was subjected to
retaliation (i.e. denials of promotion) even after Grier, the supervisor, was terminated. Id. This
case is unusual in that the plaintiff was a white female and the supervisor was a black male. Id.
184. Id. at 1325. The incidents of sexual and racial discrimination also included: Grier's curs-





The district court granted summary judgment to DYS based on uncontro-
verted facts that the plaintiff received full pay during her administrative leave,
suffered no loss in wages or tenure, and was compensated by DYS for therapy
sessions due to job-related stress. s6 Since the plaintiff had not suffered any
actual damages, the court refused to grant nominal damages under Title
VII.'8 The court recognized a split among the circuits regarding the issue of
nominal damages, 8' but ruled that because Title VII only provides equitable
relief, and since nominal damages are compensatory rather than equitable in
nature, the plaintiff was not entitled to nominal damages. 8 9
In addition, the plaintiff's contention that her lack of promotion constitut-
ed retaliatory discrimination was dismissed."9 The court found that, in light
of a state-wide hiring freeze, Griffith could not demonstrate a specific position
denied to her.'9'
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo 92 Griffith's contention that the trial
court erred in refusing to award nominal damages, 93 and affirmed the judg-
ment for DYS.' 9'
Griffith argued that she was subjected to a "hostile work environment,"
noting that she had complained to various superiors long before the situation
erupted in the spring of 1990.'9' While Griffith acknowledged that "Congress
186. Id.
187. Id. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, remedies available for Title VII discrimination
claims were purely equitable incorporating injunctive relief (i.e. reinstatement) or backpay, and in
some cases front pay and lost benefits. Attorney's fees and costs for the prevailing party were also
available. Maureen E. McClain & Kevin G. Chapman, Updates in Employment Discrimination,
491 PRACTICING L. INST. LITIG. ADMIN. PRAC. 7 (1994). Section 102 of the 1991 Act expanded
recovery to include compensatory and punitive damages in the limited cases of intentional dis-
crimination. Id.
188. See Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks & Sewer Dep't, 802 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir.
1986) (award of nominal damages will support award of reasonable attorney's fees); Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d 251, 253 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983) (even if the plaintiff does not regain her position, she might
be entitled to nominal damages and attorney's fees); T & S Serv. Assocs. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d
722, 728 n.8 (1st Cir. 1981) (where compensatory damages are not available, courts should con-
sider award of nominal damages). But see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 431 (5th
Cir. 1992) (nominal damages are legal, not equitable relief and therefore outside the scope of Title
VII remedies), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994); King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898
F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (nominal damages are not available under Title VII); Swanson v.
Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989) (nominal damages are not
available as equitable relief), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
189. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1325.
190. Id.
191. Griffith's EEOC claim was filed on April 4, 1990. The district court found that no pro-
motions were available to DYS counselors after that date. Id. at 1325-26.
192. Id. at 1326. The court applied the standard previously set forth by the Tenth Circuit that
"[s]ummary [j]udgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute over a material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Russillo v. Scarborough,
935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991)).
193. Id. Griffith asserted that nominal damages are not only an appropriate relief under Title
VII, but are necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Id.
194. Id. at 1329.
195. Id. at 1325.
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did limit the scope of remedies under Title VII," she still maintained that hers
was a valid cause of action.' 96
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that employers may be liable under an
agency theory'97 as previously set forth in Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Correc-
tions Department.'98 According to the Hirschfeld test, however, the employer
may only be liable if "(1) the harasser acted within the scope of his employ-
ment, (2) the employer failed to remedy a hostile work environment brought
about by the sexual harassment of which the employer knew or should have
known, or (3) the harasser acted under apparent authority from the employ-
er.' 9 Noting that there was no evidence presented that DYS had a history
of condoning sexual harassment, and there were undisputed facts that DYS
had remedied the situation, the court held that "the matters related by Griffith
are so isolated, infrequent in terms of total employment service, or so ques-
tionable in relation to sexual harassment of Griffith that we agree with the dis-
trict court that the record contains only conclusory and speculative allegations,
none of which meet the Hirschfeld test."'2°
The court then addressed the issue of nominal damages. Nominal damag-
es are a "token" recognizing an invasion of the plaintiff's rights despite the
absence of actual damages.2"' In an abrupt departure from precedent, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, holding that nominal
damages were compensatory in nature. Since Title VII provides equitable
rather than legal relief, nominal damages were withheld entirely. 2
The court distinguished their previous decisions in Baker 3 and Derr v.
Gulf Oil Corp.204 by arguing that those cases awarded Title VII plaintiffs
nominal damages due to their prevailing party status.205 The Griffith court
insisted that Baker and Derr did not characterize nominal damages as equita-
ble or legal, leaving the court free to decide this issue in Griffith. 6
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1330.
198. 916 F.2d 572, 576-79 (10th Cir. 1990).
199. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1330 (citing Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 576-79); see also Sauers v. Salt
Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cit. 1993) (harasser's employer could be liable as agent);
Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1170 (10th Cit. 1991) (employer may be liable for employee
indifference to citizens' rights); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th Cir.
1987) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) position that employer is
liable for employees acting in the scope of employment).
200. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1330.
201. Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cit. 1973) (citing Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888 (1952)).
202. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1327.
203. Baker, 903 F.2d at 1342 (affirming the district court's award of $1.00 in nominal damag-
es where other damages (i.e. actual and punitive) had also been recovered).
204. 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)
(finding plaintiff was the "prevailing party" because she had succeeded in proving significant
issues in the litigation)).





The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is not retroactive. 7 Because Griffith's
cause of action accrued in 1990,2' the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governed
the case despite the 1994 date of decision. Although the Tenth Circuit did not
speculate as to a result under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, its analysis of the
nature between equitable and legal remedies alone has created a dramatic legal
shift.
By rejecting its previous decisions in favor of a Seventh Circuit analy-
sis,2" the court adopted the position that "nominal damages are compensato-
ry in nature and since Title VII provides for equitable, not legal relief, nomi-
nal damages must not be awarded under Title VI. '210 The court also adopt-
ed2" ' the Fifth Circuit's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,2'
which defined nominal damages as compensatory and excluded such recovery
from Title VII. 213 Since the Fifth Circuit had previously upheld awarding
nominal damages in the Title VII context, perhaps the Tenth Circuit was sim-
ply adopting the better argument. Despite the approval of nominal damages by
most circuits, 24 all agree that Title VII only provides equitable relief.
2 5
Thus, an award of any damages would seemingly contradict their holdings.1 6
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for compensatory as well as puni-
tive damages; as such, the nature of Title VII changed from equitable to le-
gal. 17 Such a shift brings to the forefront the question of whether nominal
damages should be available in Title VII cases. The answer must be affirma-
tive.
As "hostile work environment" cases have previously illustrated, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 left many victims of sexual harassment "a right without a
remedy. '2t5 While the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for compensatory
and punitive damages, a case could conceivably arise where neither economic
nor serious mental damages can be proven. The victim should not remain
uncompensated while the perpetrator remains unpunished. "Congress has stated
that eradicating discrimination in employment is a national priority of the
highest order. Thus, an award of nominal damages would be appropriate [un-
207. See, e.g., Steinle v. Boeing Co., 24 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994)).
208. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1325.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 163-69.
210. Griffith, 17 F.3d at 1327.
211. Id.
212. 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), aff d, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
213. Id. at 431.
214. See supra note 159.
215. See, e.g., Swanson, 882 F.2d at 1240.
216. See Anne C. Levy, Righting the "Unrightable Wrong": A Renewed Call for Adequate
Remedies Under Title VII, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 567, 567-68 (1990).
217. Compensatory and punitive damages are legal and not equitable in nature. See Judith A.
Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and
Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 793 (1991).
218. Sharon T. Bradford, Note, Relief for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination: Restor-
ing Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611, 1630 (1990).
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der] Title VII." 9
Although Farrar held that the appropriate attorney's fee award might be
none at all where only nominal damages are awarded, perhaps attorney's fees
should be viewed as another source of punishing the perpetrators of discrimi-
nation and as a message that such behavior will no longer be tolerated.220
After all, awarding nominal damages while forbidding attorney's fees "vindi-
cates the plaintiff's rights but does not force the defendant employer to...
alter its relationship with the plaintiff' or consider future improvements in the
work environment.22 Further, denying attorney's fees might discourage attor-
neys from taking these meritorious cases. The Tenth Circuit will most likely
affirm the right to nominal damages in future Title VII cases. However, given
Farrar and the Tenth Circuit's conservative nature, attorney's fees will not
likely be procured where only nominal damages are awarded.
CONCLUSION
During its most recent term, the Tenth Circuit evinced a decidedly conser-
vative view of the status quo. O'Driscoll reaffirmed the after-acquired evi-
dence doctrine and would have extended its coverage but for the Supreme
Court's recent decision in McKennon.
In Griffith, the court adopted the more conservative view that nominal
damages should not be allowed in Title VII cases. Although the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 renders the issue mostly moot, current decisions best indicate the
court's future rulings.
The most surprising decision of this Survey period was the Tenth Circuit's
holding in Hurd. The court's post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 rationale was
analogous to its pre-Civil Rights Act of 1991 rationale. Hurd, a case where a
previous decision decided under Title VII was later adopted in the ADEA con-
text, reflects that the ties between Title VII and the ADEA remain intact.
Stephanie Van Auken
219. Yelonsky, supra note 157, at 441 (footnote omitted).
220. Note that punitive damages are currently available under Title VII only where "the com-
plaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discrimina-
tory practices with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(l) (Supp. V. 1993).
221. Yelonsky, supra note 157, at 441.
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